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 In Plato’s Theaethetus, Protagoras tries to defend the claim that ‘man is the 
measure of all things’. The objections of Socrates destroy this claim, but, in spite of 
this, relativism has resurfaced repeatedly in the course of history in various forms. 
The epistemological version holds that claims involving knowledge and truth are rela-
tive to time, to place, to background principles, and so on. In short, such claims are 
relative to the standards used in evaluating them. Protagoras’ version was basically 
epistemological, because he held that a thing ‘is to me such as it appears to me, and is 
to you as it appears to you’ (152a). As regards ethics, relativism retains its basic char-
acter. It becomes the thesis that moral appraisals are essentially dependent on the 
standards within a social group. Nowadays, cultural, historical, and geographical di-
versity shows, certainly more than in Plato’s time, how different such moral standards 
can be.  
 Utilitarianism is not directly related to relativism. It is a moral theory with two 
major characteristics: first, it treats pleasure or desire-satisfaction as the only element 
in human good; second, it regards the morality of actions as entirely dependent on 
consequences or results for human well-being. The simplest version of utilitarianism 
is a form of hedonism: pleasure and pain are the only indications that are relevant for 
the evaluation of human living. In Jeremy Bentham’s words, ‘Nature has placed man-
kind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.’1 
 The study of relativism and utilitarianism are crucial today. As regards the 
former, two reasons come to mind. First, relativism seems to have a power of survival 
that defies philosophical argument. As mentioned above, more than two thousand 
years ago, Socrates had uncovered its crucial inconsistency: if man is a measure of 
literally all things, the very idea of measure evaporates. Hence a global relativism 
based on the vague idea of ‘true for me’ is inconsistent. Holding this thesis means 
sawing off the branch on which one is sitting. The amazing thing is that, in spite of 
this straightforward refutation, relativism enjoys great popularity among ordinary 
people. Why are people taken in so easily? There must be some further issues worth 
examining. The second reason involves the rhetoric of relativism. This seems to have 
the specific task of drawing attention to something very useful, namely the variety of 
viewpoints available for the same given reality, each viewpoint giving rise to a par-
ticular interpretation. This idea is essentially an extrapolation from visual experience, 
                                                 
1 J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], London 1982, chapter 1. 
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where one and the same landscape is perceived from different perspectives corre-
sponding to each observer. In a sense, relativism seems to remind us that, the more 
perspectives we have, the better will be our overall appreciation. As regards utilitari-
anism, it is easy to see the reasons behind its strength and popularity as an ethical the-
ory. These lie in its ability to replace the confusion that often exists in common-sense 
moral intuitions with a unified, accessible system of thought. It treats all moral ques-
tions in a uniform fashion and applies the analytical approach that has proved so ser-
viceable in natural science. Because of the quasi-mathematical nature of the theory, 
much of what is done in economics depends on utilitarian doctrines. 
 What I propose to do in this paper is to concentrate primarily on theoretical 
aspects. This does not mean I will avoid all mention of ethics. I assume, with Aris-
totle, that ‘the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge 
is action’ (Metaphysics 993b 20), but I also assume, following the same Aristotle, that 
theoretical and practical reason are intimately related.2 Moreover, I acknowledge that, 
since the spectacular rise of the natural sciences around the fifteenth century, the 
search for truth has been associated, sometimes exclusively, with the method of these 
sciences. Given these two starting points, my project can be formulated as follows: to 
explore what we can learn from a comparison between the methods of science and the 
major issues of relativism and utilitarianism. 
1. Science and Relativism 
 Relativism can be understood better when contrasted to its opposite, absolut-
ism, according to which there exists one description of the world, true for all view-
points, that determines whether any statement is true or false. Absolutism is often as-
sociated with natural science, seen by many as the discipline that is uniquely cumula-
tive, progressive, and beyond all particular view-points. Relativism is usually associ-
ated with disciplines like ethics and aesthetics, where debate is often difficult and 
therefore better avoided, in line with the maxim de gustibus non est disputandum.  
 If this distinction is correct, science and ethics are essentially different, and the 
difference is explained precisely by reference to relativism. Recent studies on this 
point have concentrated on the very nature of these two disciplines. For instance, Ber-
nard Williams distinguishes sharply between science and ethics in the following way.3 
On the one hand, as regards science, we can hope that, on each question, our inquiries 
will show a convergence on an answer. And the best explanation of the convergence 
involves ‘the idea that the answer represents how things are’ (p. 136). This is because 
our scientific concepts are linked causally to what happens in the world. Moreover, 
Williams holds that science can provide the basis for an absolute conception of the 
                                                 
2 For instance De Motu VII, 701a8-12: ‘But how is it that thought is sometimes followed by action, 
sometimes not; sometimes by movement, sometimes not? What happens seems parallel to the case of 
thinking and inferring about immovable objects. There the end is the truth seen (for, when one thinks 
the two propositions, one thinks and puts together the conclusion) but here the two propositions result 
in a conclusion which is an action — for example whenever one thinks that every man ought to walk, 
and that one is a man oneself, straightaway one walks.’ 
3 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: Fontana, Collins, 1985, chapter 5. 
This chapter is crucial to my argument here. Important commentators include: Hilary Putnam, ‘Objec-
tivity and the Science-Ethics Distinction, in: The Quality of Life, edited by M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 143-157; Nicholas Jardine, ‘Science, ethics and objectivity’, in: 
World, Mind, and Ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J.E.J. Altham and 
R. Harrison, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 32-45; Christopher Hookway, ‘Fallibilism and 
objectivity: science and ethics’, in: World, Mind, and Ethics: essays on the ethical philosophy of Ber-
nard Williams, ed. J.E.J. Altham and R. Harrison, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 46-67. 
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tion of the world. In his words, this conception is ‘to a maximum degree independent 
of our perspective and its peculiarities’ (p.138). On the other hand, as regards ethics, 
Williams is convinced that we cannot hope that our inquires will yield any such con-
vergence guided by the way things really are. There is no causal effect of the world on 
the way we define and use ethical concepts, like right and duty, good and evil. More-
over, there is no space for an explanation of our perspectival ethical concepts by re-
sorting to a deeper level of explanation that is allegedly absolute, as is done in science 
when description in terms of primary qualities is used to explain the description in 
terms of secondary qualities. 
 In my view, Williams is here polarising the issue too much. He employs a 
simplified version of both science and ethics. In fact, some reflection will show that 
science is not as absolutist as he takes it to be. Nor is ethics as relativist as he seems to 
imply. Let us take science first. If science is indeed as Williams portrays it, we need 
to give an account of world-guided convergence. Some philosophers of science, like 
Richard Boyd, have offered an acceptable causal explanation that stretches from enti-
ties in the world to our observation and theory.4 This simple picture, however, is not 
enough. To be realistic, we need to consider science in its entirety. We need to stretch 
all the way from the theoretical entities in the world via experimental outcomes in 
their being observed, via interpretation of results, publication of papers, and thence 
via the whole international complex of debates and negotiations that result in a con-
sensus being reached. The processes of calibration of instruments, of replication of 
experiments, of debate over the reliability and credibility of experimenters, of selec-
tion and presentation of findings for publications, and so on, are extremely complex. 
Consensus regarding particular experimental findings, such as the consensus on the 
value of the charge of the electron, is simple. In such cases a high degree of world-
guided convergence may be expected. Consensus are regards the acceptability of an 
entire theory, however, is very complex. There is no clear idea of world-guided con-
vergence here. Pierre Duhem’s studies show how particular cases of causal contact 
with reality are never enough to justify our decision for or against an entire theory.5 
His famous thesis of holism means that the causal link gives way to other criteria, 
such as simplicity of explanation, and so on. And being guided by theoretical simplic-
ity is not world-guidedness. The upshot is that Williams is exaggerating the element 
of world-guided convergence in science. This discipline is not as absolutist as he 
thinks. 
 As regards ethics, his judgement is exaggerated in the opposite sense. He seri-
ously underestimates the degree of objectivity that some respectable moral theories 
can enjoy. Consider, for instance, an Aristotelian-style naturalistic approach to ethics. 
Here a virtue is a disposition needed for human well-being to be optimised in a given 
society. Now purely conventional factors cannot ensure that human well-being be op-
timised. There must be some conditions linked to how humans are that are satisfied in 
such societies. For instance, societies that do not cater for essential biological human 
needs cannot be said to be optimising human well-being, whatever their culture or 
                                                 
4 For instance: Richard Boyd, ‘Realism, Approximate Truth, and Philosophical Method’, in: Scientific 
Theories, edited by C. Wade Savage, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (volume 14), 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, pp. 355-391. 
5 He writes: ‘le physicien ne peut jamais soumettre au control de l’expérience une hypothèse isolée, 
mais seulement tout un ensemble d’hypothèses; lorsque l’expérience est en désaccord avec ses prévi-
sions, elle lui apprend que l’une au moins des hypothèses qui constituent cet ensemble est inacceptable 
et doit être modifiée; mais elle ne lui désigne pas cell qui doit être changée.’ La théorie physique, son 
objet et sa structure, Paris: Chevalier & Rivière, 1906, p. 307. 
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conventions. How food is cooked is a matter of convention, but the fact that there 
must be food to ensure the livelihood of members of society is not. The idea of virtue 
is here anchored on such naturalistic considerations. Any discussion, therefore, on a 
particular virtue may be inscribed within a converging inquiry commanded by objec-
tive factors, namely by what really aids towards the optimisation of well-being.6 The 
consequence is that ethics is not necessarily as relativist as Williams seems to imply 
in his dichotomy between science and ethics. 
 In line with these reflections, I will argue that science and ethics can be seen 
as quite similar because they both have an objective dimension and a relativist, or per-
spectival, dimension.7 Hence I want to defend an element of objectivity for both 
ethics and science, sliding neither towards rigid absolutism nor towards global relativ-
ism. I will do this by showing that there are indeed plausible ways of understanding 
what I will call ‘open objectivity’. I will mention two ways. 
Precedents 
 The first way involves the idea of precedent. In general, a precedent is a pre-
vious case or legal decision that is taken as a guide for subsequent cases. In terms of 
precedents, the idea of open-objectivity involves not world-guided convergence but 
precedent-guided convergence. This has been proposed by Nicholas Jardine.8 He ex-
plains it by referring to how a belief can be justified. In causal justification, the given 
belief is sustained by methods that are described in causal terms. For instance, the be-
lief that the charge of the electron is 1.602 × 10-19 C is sustained by referring to a 
causal chain of events, essentially the various experimental measurements, that result 
in this belief as its final effect.  
 In justification by precedent, the belief is supported by methods considered 
reliable by testing against independently warranted precedents and standards. This 
model holds for both science and ethics. In science, instruments are calibrated and 
research strategies are promoted or attacked by appeal to their track records. For in-
stance, when, during the eighteenth century, the orbit of the planet Uranus was ob-
served to be persistently irregular within the Newtonian paradigm, astronomer Urbain 
Le Verrier did not consider Newton’s theory falsified. He persevered in the face of 
contrary evidence. He justified this attitude by reference to the excellent track record 
                                                 
6 This point is very well defended in Martha Nussbaum, ‘Non-relative virtues: an Aristotelian Ap-
proach’ in: The Quality of Life, edited by M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 
pp. 242-269. 
7 My use of the term perspectival derives primarily from visual experience, within a realist context. A 
recent study I found very useful is: Miranda Fricker, Perspectival Realism, unpublished D.Phil thesis, 
Oxford University, 1996. Some uses of ‘perspectival’ minimise the element of responsibility to an ex-
ternal reality. For instance, Friedrich Nietzsche’s much discussed perspectivism is more concerned 
with the human desire to dominate. The idea of an objective truth, over and above the various perspec-
tives, cancels out. In his Der Wille zur Macht § 616, he writes: ‘Dass der Werth der Welt in unserer 
Interpretation liegt [...] geht durch meine Schriften. Die Welt, die uns etwas angeht, ist falsh, d.h. ist 
kein Thatbestand, sondern eine Ausdichtung und Rundung über einer mageren Summe von Beobach-
tugen; sie ist “im Flusse”, als etwas Werdendes, als eine sich immer neu verschiebende Falschheit, die 
sich niemals der Wahrheit nähert: denn – es giebt kiene “Wahrheit”.’ For some appreciation of 
Nietzsche’s nuanced views on perspectivism, I’m indebted to: Maudmarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth 
and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Steven D. Hales, Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, Ur-
bana University of Illinois Press, 2000; 
8 Jardine, Nicholas, ‘Science, ethics and objectivity’, in: World, Mind, and Ethics: essays on the ethical 
philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J.E.J. Altham and R. Harrison, Cambridge University Press, 1995, 
pp. 32-45. 
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that theory had in explaining the behaviour of other celestial bodies. His perseverance 
paid well, because he used Newton’s theory to postulate the existence of a yet-
undiscovered planet, which was then found exactly as he said, and was named Nep-
tune.9  
 Something similar happens in ethics. Ethical arguments whose validity is at 
issue in one context are criticised in terms of their acceptable or unacceptable results 
in other contexts. Consider the distinction, drawn within the context of philosophy of 
law, between statute-law and case-law. The term ‘statute-law’ refers to the idea that a 
set of rules are instituted with the aim of binding all future cases. In this way, the 
community in which such legislation occurs may be said to found or create its iden-
tity, partly or wholly as the case may be, precisely by the establishment of such laws. 
In the context of science, Karl Popper may be singled out as an example of a philoso-
pher who adopted the statute-law approach to establish the logical structure of scien-
tific method once and for all. The term ‘case-law’, on the contrary, refers to the prin-
ciples and rules laid down in judicial decisions together with the generalisations based 
on past decisions of courts and tribunals for particular cases. The fundamental point 
about case-law is that these previous cases are looked upon as normative. Resolved 
cases set a precedent. They are considered the source of rules to be applied for new 
cases. Courts reach decisions with the knowledge that their decisions are laying down 
strong indications which will be followed in the future by later courts. This is quite 
different from the laying down of a definite system of laws for the entire future.10  
 My claim is that this way of understanding how both scientific and ethical in-
quiry proceeds is a plausible form of open-objectivity. The idea of precedent-guided 
convergence, corresponding to the case-law approach, is open in the sense that past 
experience is considered a source of education on how to face the future without re-
nouncing the responsibility of breaking new ground. It is objective in the sense that it 
does not involve arbitrary decision-making. In this perspective, we accept the reality 
of a certain continuity in history and yet we accept also the reality of possible deep 
changes at the level of the rules of method. We do not wilt in the face of pure novelty 
but remain open to readjust our categorical framework, if need be, in an act of intel-
lectual conversion. 
Primary and secondary precepts 
 The second way of accounting for open-objectivity involves the distinction 
between primary and secondary precepts of natural law. I draw inspiration here from 
St. Thomas Aquinas. He conceives of ethics as scientia practica, with the task of 
making universal principles specific in order that they can meet the assorted require-
ments of particular cases. He was well aware of the difference between theoretical 
reason, which is mathematical and scientific in character, and practical reason. In S.T. 
Ia-IIæ Q94, he writes: 
In the case of specific conclusions of theory, the truth obtains among all, even 
though it is not equally known to all. For instance, it is true among all men 
                                                 
9 Urbain J.J. le Verrier (1811-1877) was one of the prominent scientists who, inspired by the return of 
Halley’s comet in 1835, developed the idea of the perturbing agency of planets beyond Uranus. For a 
study of how Newtonianism set a precedent for many generations after him, see: Simon Schaeffer, 
‘Newtonianism’ in: A Companion to the History of Modern Science, R.C. Olby, G.N. Cantor, J.R.R. 
Christie & M.J.S. Hodge, (eds.), Routledge, 1996, pp. 610-626. 
10 Statute-law and case-law approaches for scientific activity are mentioned in A.F. Sanders, Michael 
Polanyi’s Post-Critical Epistemology, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988, pp. 138-145. I develop the discus-
sion in: L. Caruana, Holism and the Understanding of Science, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, pp. 102-104. 
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that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, even though not 
everybody knows this. But in the case of specific conclusions arrived at by 
practical reason it is not the same truth or practical correctness that holds 
among all men, nor among those where the truth is the same and equally 
known. From this principle it is possible to advance the specific conclusion 
that goods held in trust should be restored to their rightful owner. Now this is 
true in the majority of cases. But a particular case may possibly arise in which 
it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore any goods held in 
trust; so for example, if the goods were claimed for the purpose of fighting 
against one’s country.11 
 To solve this problem, Aquinas resorts to the distinction between primary and 
secondary precepts. The primary principles of natural law are equally well-known to 
all and are immutable. The secondary principles, being proximate conclusions from 
the foregoing principles, are formulated at the level of action and neither apply in all 
circumstances nor, when they do apply, are always known. To some people, this neat 
distinction between two levels may appear somewhat simplistic. A continuum of vari-
ous shades between the two ends of the precept-spectrum may be more appropriate. 
My aim here, however, is concerned with the question of levels. It is rather to ex-
amine one possible, coherent way of describing what I called ‘open objectivity’, and 
the openness factor lies at the secondary-precept end. In fact, the secondary precept is 
formulated according to the circumstances, and is thus variable.  
 In this sense, as I see it, there is a kind of relativism in Aquinas. This situation 
is somewhat similar to what we experience when, say, we want to draw water from a 
garden well. We buy a pump, but we need to fix it up in a particular way for our par-
ticular well. The fixed pump, pipes, hooks and all, has a form relative to the surround-
ings, but the central pump on sale is always the same. How to fix it requires our intel-
ligence. But no two gardens are the same. What works well for fixing the pump in one 
garden may not be suitable for another garden.12  
 This kind of relativism does not affect the moral dimension of our action. 
Even though the precept is expressed relative to the circumstances, it is still morally 
binding. The element of open-objectivity lies here. We acknowledge the idea of natu-
ral law as an abstract idea corresponding to the belief in the divine origin and order of 
the universe. We acknowledge moreover the fact that some secondary precepts of this 
natural law are defeasible in their application since they can be confronted with the 
significant variability that results from the contingent nature of human actions and 
                                                 
11 The crucial expression ut in pluribus shows that for Aquinas moral judgements and principles are 
defeasible in their application because they can be trumped by the emergence of further specifics in 
particular cases (what Aristotle called καθ εκαστα, cf. Nic. Eth. I. 3, 1094b 11-27). Note also S.T. 
Q96, a.6 ad 3: ‘Et si posset legislator omnes casus considerare, non oporteret ut omnes exprimeret, 
propter confusionem vitandam; sed legem ferre deberet secundum ea quae in pluribus accidunt’ (Even 
were the legislator able to take everything into consideration, he still should not set them all downin 
detail, for this would lead to confusion; but he should frame a law according to the usual run of things). 
12 Some commentators are highly suspicious of the association of Aquinas with relativism (e.g. F. 
Copleston, Aquinas, London: Barnes & Noble, 1955, p. 219; A. Armstrong, Primary and Secondary 
Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 167-8). Their 
objections however are not directed against the kind of relativism I mention here, which is equivalent 
to a non-arbitrary variability due to the particular circumstances. See also: D.M. Nelson, The Priority 
of Prudence: Virtue and Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas and the implications for Modern Ethics, Uni-
versity Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992; M.W.F. Stone, ‘The Angelic Doctor and the 
Stagirite: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary ‘Aristotelian’ Ethics’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, vol. 101 (2001), pp. 97-128. 
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circumstances.13 
 In science, the same point may be made. Many philosophers and scientists as-
sume that there is a single, uniform subject called ‘science’ that is pursued by all sci-
entists in their investigations. This is severely inadequate. What we see is not a single 
discipline but numerous sciences, each with a different concern. And this is evident 
even when investigating the same object. Take for instance the melting of the polar 
ice-caps. Meteorologists study this phenomenon from a physical and climatological 
point of view, whereas zoologists study the same melting of the ice-caps from a zoo-
logical point of view, and ecologists from the ecological point of view. The data is 
selected according to their various points of view. The data that is relevant for a 
physicist is different from the data that is relevant to the interests or concerns of a zo-
ologist or of a climatologist. The element of relativism lies here. What is true, in the 
sense of being relevant, for the meteorologist is not true for the zoologist. It is not 
true, or rather it is beyond truth and falsity, because it lies beyond the zoologist’s ho-
rizon. 
 Again we see that science and ethics are not as different as Williams seemed 
to imply. Moreover, I have tried to show that there are at least two plausible ways of 
avoiding the extremes of total absolutism and total relativism. Both disciplines can be 
seen as having an objective dimension and a relativist, or perspectival, dimension. 
The first way is in terms of precedent-guided convergence. The second is in terms of 
primary and secondary precedents.  
2. Science and Utilitarianism 
 I will proceed with my project by exploring what can be learnt from a com-
parison between the methods of science and utilitarianism. As I mentioned above, the 
classic origins of utilitarianism are found in the works of J. Bentham and J.S. Mill.14 
The basic idea is that evaluating action by referring to Divine Law, or to social con-
vention should give way to a consideration of human well-being or happiness as the 
touchstone for moral evaluation. There seem to be two main reasons for thinking that 
utilitarianism is closely related to science. First, there is the fact that utilitarianism 
promises a unified system of moral thought based on the analytical approach that has 
proved so effective in the natural sciences. In attempting to resolve all moral issues by 
relying on one uniform ultimate criterion, utilitarianism has appeared to be the ‘ra-
tional’ moral theory par excellence, on a par with scientific explanation. It allows a 
formal, neat mode of maximising one homogenous magnitude. It thus offers a stan-
dard of consistency and completeness that might seem unachievable otherwise. Sec-
ondly, both utilitarianism and science seek to provide liberation from the constraints 
of voluntaristic and arbitrary systems of thought that would ultimately be dehumanis-
                                                 
13 Situating the Ten Commandments in this picture is important. I am working with the assumption that 
these commandments were revealed by God not as the one and only starting point for practical reason-
ing but rather as a help on the way. We could have worked out for ourselves these commandments, 
but, given our tendency towards self-deception and sluggish thinking, we would have needed a consid-
erably long time. In some crucial areas of life, God in his kindness has revealed the correct answers our 
practical reason should yield. The Ten Commandments, therefore, are not principles from which our 
practical reason is meant to start, but indications where it should arrive. This view of things, I take it, 
was the view of Aquinas: see for instance his discussion on the Law of the Old Testament S.T. IaIIæ 
Q.100, a.1. 
14 Especially J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, first published 
1789; John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, first published 1861. 
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 Further similarity between these disciplines can be also found in some details 
of their method. Both scientific research and utilitarianism hope to arrive at opinions 
that will be endorsed by the independent findings of other people. Both disciplines 
often consider themselves engaged in the task of mapping the real order: science dis-
covering the real contours of the material world, utilitarianism determining the correct 
course of action for each possible action-situation. Both disciplines accomplish this 
task in two steps. First they choose some parameters of the objective real world they 
deal with, then they manipulate these parameters within a ‘calculus’ so as to produce 
an objective picture that is allegedly beyond any particular view-point. The crucial 
issue that deserves considerable attention is the step whereby both scientists and utili-
tarian moral philosophers choose the relevant parameters. What I propose, therefore, 
is to explore this particular area by comparing the ways concrete situations give rise 
to theoretical discourse.  
Idea and Theory in Science 
 The classical, technical term associated with this point is abstraction. Having 
ideas and organising them into theories starts here. Abstraction refers to the mental 
process by which a person recognises individuals and organises them into groups by 
identifying unifying features. This is done by accepting some facets of a thing or 
situation, while other facets are discarded. For example, Aristotle was convinced that 
an object has not only sensible aspects, that determine how it is perceived, but also 
intelligible aspects that determine how it is understood as being of one kind rather 
than another. The intelligible aspects, for example the form of a thing, are grasped 
through the sensible aspects. In general, human inquirers are faced with innumerable 
singulars: this tree, that tree, this horse, that horse. These singulars appear as fluctuat-
ing colours, shapes, and so on. Through the act of abstraction, rational creatures are 
able to extract the intelligible aspect from these singulars, and arrive at the idea of 
tree, horse. This is the Aristotelian story. In a post-Galielean culture like ours, domi-
nated by the scientific mentality, abstraction is better understood in terms of mathe-
matics. It can be seen as the process by which the inquirer identifies the essential 
geometric and mathematical features of the object or phenomenon under investiga-
tion. This is done so as to predict changes in some of the variables involved. For ex-
ample, a falling stone is seen as a point-mass, a gas as random motion of point-
masses, a plant as a self-regulating system needing minerals and light. 
 Although fundamental, abstraction seems to involve a problem. It is essen-
tially a mental operation that always leaves something out. It neglects those aspects 
that make the individual unique. To understand a thing or situation, the inquirer must 
discard the individuality or uniqueness of that thing or situation. Only if one goes be-
yond, and effectively leaves out, the individual horse, can one grasp the idea of horse 
as a universal. For natural science, the same thing happens. The shape of the falling 
                                                 
15 That utilitarianism is related to science in its methods and aspirations is acknowledged even by its 
opponents. For instance, in Veritatis Splendor §76, we find: ‘These theories [consequentialist and pro-
portionalist theories, including utilitarianism in all its forms] can gain a certain persuasive force from 
their affinity to the scientific mentality, which is rightly concerned with ordering technical and eco-
nomic activities on the basis of a calculation of resources and profits, procedures and their effects. 
They seek to provide liberation from the constraints of a voluntaristic and arbitrary morality of obliga-
tion which would ultimately be dehumanising. These theories however are not faithful to the Church’s 
teaching, when they believe they can justify, as morally good, deliberate choices of kind of behaviour 
contrary to the commandments of the divine and natural law.’ 
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stone is neglected when it is considered a point-mass. Broadly speaking, the aim of 
science is very often to arrive at the equation that represents many individual things or 
events. The equation necessarily goes beyond the individuality of each situation de-
scribed. 
 For most areas in science, this neglect has no serious consequences. Some sys-
tems are so free of complications that we easily forget that abstraction is leaving 
something behind. For example, explaining the movement of the planets in the New-
tonian way, namely in terms of mutual attraction and resulting motion of points in 
space, leaves practically nothing unexplained. Other systems, however, are notori-
ously difficult. The situation becomes chronic when the method of the natural sci-
ences is applied without qualification to the human sciences. The latter try to explain 
areas directly influenced by human decisions. In these cases, the inevitable neglect of 
the individual due to abstraction can give rise to gross deformities and even injustice. 
 It is clear, therefore, that for complex issues abstraction may not always offer 
the same results. Knowledge is often needed for a particular purpose, and this purpose 
determines the way we abstract. It determines the aspects we retain as relevant and 
the others we discard as irrelevant.16 At the start of the scientific revolution, historians 
identify an interesting shift in attitude. From a vague desire to acquire knowledge for 
its own sake, Francis Bacon shifts to a desire for a kind of knowledge that guarantees 
a domination of nature so as to ameliorate the condition of humans.17 The borderline 
between relevant and irrelevant changes. The result is that a new map of the given is 
inaugurated, and it is still with us today. This map is drawn according to the presup-
position that nature is something of a menace to be conquered, tamed and exploited 
for the benefit of humans. When two different versions, or maps, are available for the 
same reality, the natural question to ask is: which is the correct one? Both maps in-
clude some aspects and neglect others. Is therefore the very map-making process a 
falsifying one since it cannot include all the aspects together?  
 The problem runs deep. We accept that the real is made up of singulars. We 
accept that the act of understanding involves leaving out the individuality aspect to 
arrive at the intelligible universal. It seems necessary to conclude that abstraction is 
inherently fallacious. It seems to be a process that forbids the knowledge of things as 
they really are. The Scholastics had debated this point and arrived at the thesis: ab-
strahentium non est mandacium.18 Through abstraction, our possession of the thing is 
certainly not complete. We do not have the entire thing in our minds. This fact, how-
ever, does not mean that abstraction supplies us with false knowledge. It simply 
                                                 
16 This point is discussed in various philosophical schools. In the tradition directly concerned with in-
terpretation, hermeneutics, it is often discussed in terms of hermeneutical prejudice, which can be posi-
tive or negative. For instance, Hans-Georg Gadamer writes: ‘“Vorurteil” heißt also durchaus nicht: 
falsches Urteil, sondern in seinem Begriff liegt, daß es positiv und negativ gewerter werden kann. Of-
fenbar ist die Anlehnung an das lateinishe praejudicium darin wirksam, daß neben dem negativen auch 
ein positiver Akzent auf dem Worte liegen kann. Es gibt préjugés légitimes.’ Wahrheit und Methode, 
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1975, Teil II, Kap. II, §1a, p. 255. 
17  Bacon writes: ‘Knowledge and human power come to the same thing’, and ‘nature cannot be con-
quered except by obeying her’ (Instauratio Magna, 1,3). For him, the purpose of science is the exten-
sion of the dominion of the human race over nature. 
18 Neglecting some characteristics of a thing in order to explore one aspect more fully does not involve 
deception, provided that the fact of neglecting these characteristics is not denied. Aristotle was aware 
of this point, at least as regards mathematics: ‘That is why he [the mathematician] separates them; for 
in thought they are separable from motion, and it makes no difference, nor does any falsity result, if 
they are separated. The holders of the theory of Forms do the same, though they are not aware of it.’ 
(Physics, 193b34). 
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means that full possession of the thing is not possible via the act of understanding.  
 This reply merits further investigation. As in most other cases, the Scholastics 
offer us precious insights as regards simple, everyday cases but leave us rather unpre-
pared when it comes to more complex cases. Does smoking cause lung cancer? This 
is a pressing question involving very complex issues. What are we to do when faced 
with such questions? The realities involved here, namely smoking and lung cancer, 
are perplexing. The very description of these realities defies consensus. There is a 
multitude of variables to choose from. It is not difficult to see how various lines of 
inquiry open up, even when considering the very same question. Moreover, there is 
the possibility of distortion of reality or outright mistake. This arises when, in the act 
of abstraction, the neglected aspects turn out to be the important ones and the retained 
ones the trivial ones. How can this line of reasoning be applied to utilitarianism? 
Idea and Theory in Utilitarianism 
 Just like scientists, defenders of utilitarianism engage in the organisation of 
ideas to form a theory. The various sciences have varying degrees of possible defor-
mation, depending on their object of study. In the mathematical hard sciences, which 
may be seen as situated on one end of the spectrum, the possible deformation is often 
a minimum. This is so because the object of study is usually an ideal case with no in-
terfering causes. In the human sciences, situated on the opposite end of the spectrum, 
the possible deformation is considerable. The most glaring example is probably the 
one involving ecology and economics. When we abstract with the attitude of dominat-
ing Nature, of considering it a menace to be conquered, tamed and taken advantage of 
for the benefit of humans, we are essentially retaining some aspects that are in line 
with one particular project, and neglecting others that are not in line. This kind of ab-
straction can be devastating. In the words of Michael Northcott who works in the area 
of environmental ethics, 
...the modern money economy operates regardless of natural ecological con-
straints because its measures of wealth and of exchange relations are ab-
stracted from natural ecological systems. The spatial abstraction of modern 
economics is so extreme that even were all the rainforests to disappear and sea 
levels to rise two feet, and the climate warms by 4 degrees and large parts of 
the world become uninhabitable, individuals and companies who had burnt the 
energy or consumed the forests in industrial production would still be reck-
oned wealthy in economic parlance.19 
When, in economics, abstraction is not handled with care, money is considered the 
only measure of progress. Moreover, wealth in terms of money can obviously be 
maximised by the destruction of some people’s cultures, and even livelihoods. Sad to 
say, this is the mentality that is becoming global as it dominates both the developed 
and developing countries world-wide.  
 My claim is that utilitarianism inevitably sits together with economics at this 
end of the spectrum, namely the end of high possible deformity in understanding. Ab-
straction in utilitarianism can result in three main deformations.  
 The first concerns its omission of persons. Utilitarianism is blind to certain 
fundamental aspects of the people involved in the situation it is meant to account for. 
Bernard Williams’ famous critique highlights precisely this weakness. In one typical 
argument, he imagined a man, Jim, who finds himself in the square of a small South 
                                                 
19  Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1996, pp. 79-80. 
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American town, confronted by twenty captured Indians.20 The captain who has 
quashed their rebellion declares that if Jim kills one of them, the others will be al-
lowed to go free; if he does not, they will all die. According to utilitarianism, which 
considers the goodness of an action to reside in how much it increases the overall sum 
of happiness, there is no problem for Jim: he should kill one of them. There is, how-
ever, a problem. The distinction between my killing someone, and its coming about 
because of what I do that someone else kills them is crucial. For utilitarians, however, 
such a distinction is completely invisible. Utilitarianism strips human life of all that 
makes it worthwhile, failing to take account of each person’s integrity, of the projects 
central to their lives, of the obligations and loyalty owed to family and friends. The 
abstraction involved here makes an agent a mere source of effects in the world. Essen-
tially, utilitarianism sees persons as locations of their respective utilities. In the utili-
tarian calculus, ‘persons do not count as individuals any more than individual petrol 
tanks do in the analysis of the national consumption of petroleum.’21 
 The second problem results from the fact that utilitarianism abstracts selec-
tively as regards what constitutes genuine human flourishing. The simplest version of 
utilitarianism can be seen as a form of hedonism: pleasure and pain are the only indi-
cations that are relevant for the evaluation of human living. More recent versions of 
utilitarianism broaden the idea of pleasure-seeking to include also the seeking of satis-
faction or the seeking of happiness. In the version known as direct consequentialism, 
only the consequences of a singular act are relevant in deciding whether it is good or 
not. Hence, an act is morally obligatory if and only if it produces a greater balance of 
pleasure over pain, or of desire-satisfaction, than any alternative action available to 
the agent. The moral terrain is simplified so as to be amenable to calculation. In fact, 
direct utilitarianism is essentially a moral theory ‘for the ideal case’ just as most equa-
tions in physics. For instance, the simple equation s = ½gt2, describing the relation-
ship between distance covered during a free fall of duration t, is intended only as ap-
plicable to the ideal case that involves no air friction, no angular momentum, and 
none of the many other factors that make up real-life situations.  
 The same thing happens for utilitarianism. Abstracting from the various ele-
ments that make up well-being, utilitarianism picks only those factors that allow cal-
culation. It often assumes that only pleasure and pain count. Even if further refine-
ment is added, it is usually done in terms of a kind of ideal observer who has informa-
tion that transcends the actual social situation. For instance, the ‘true’ preferences of 
citizens are often stipulated independently of any expressed preferences by those citi-
zens themselves. The ideal observer is assumed more knowledgeable than the citi-
zens. The fiction of the ideal observer is made even worse by assuming that utilitari-
anism furnishes us with a complete theory, in the sense that it offers a way of arriving 
at the correct ranking of values or priorities in any kind of conflictual situation. The 
gross artificiality of this idea is evident when, for instance, a cost-benefit analysis is 
applied to such subjects as the ‘valuation of life’ in debates concerning euthanasia. 
The upshot is that utilitarianism, at least in its direct consequentialist form, abstracts 
selectively from the complex reality constituting human well-being. 
 The third problem I would like to highlight concerns another kind of abstrac-
tion. This time, our focus will not be on the persons involved, as in problem one, nor 
                                                 
20 J.J.C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: for and against, Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 
98. 
21 Amartya Sen, & Bernard Williams, ‘Introduction’, in: Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. A. Sen & B. 
Williams, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 4. 
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on the nature of well-being, as in problem two, but on the very morality of the act un-
der consideration. As has already been mentioned, utilitarianism limits itself to the 
idea that the morality of the act lies in the evaluation of the amount of desire-
satisfaction that it produces. Since this version has had to face serious problems, some 
philosophers tried to avoid direct consequentialism by adopting rule consequential-
ism, sometimes also called indirect consequentialism. According to rule consequen-
tialism, the rightness of an action depends not on the consequences of the action itself 
but on the consequences of various sets of rules. Direct consequentialism is different 
because it evaluates actions in terms of their own consequences, while indirect conse-
quentialism evaluates them in terms of the consequences of holding on to the particu-
lar set of rules they represent. For instance, according to indirect consequentialism, 
but not according to direct consequentialism, it is wrong to kill an innocent person so 
as to quell a riot that would lead to the killing of many. It is wrong because it would 
be creating a rule that is harmful for society in the long run.  
 In spite of this move from direct to indirect consequentialism, the fundamental 
character of utilitarianism remains, namely its linking the morality of an act exclu-
sively to consequences. Out of the complexity of the morality of an act, only this fac-
tor is singled out. Abstraction is again at work, and, this time, what is left out is im-
portant. It is certainly not difficult to see how the morality of an act is much broader 
than consequences only. There are good reasons to hold that what determines the mo-
rality of an act includes its object, its end, and its circumstances. I understand the ob-
ject of the act here as that which is actually done or projected as a possible human ac-
complishment, as in the case of the object of murder being the killing of an innocent 
person. In brief, the object of my act is the answer to the question: what am I doing? 
The end of the act is the purpose or motive for which the agent acts. The question 
here is: why am I doing it? The circumstances of the act are individuating conditions 
that, although in themselves not part of the nature of the action, nevertheless modify 
in some real way its moral quality. For instance when, where, and how I do something 
may affect whether what I did was right or wrong. Of these various factors, 
utilitarianism abstracts only the consequences of an action. Apart from the distortion 
that results from neglecting the other factors, the utilitarian attitude bypasses the 
important point that the consequences of an action affect its morality only insofar as 
they are known and willed. If the consequences are known and willed, then they 
become part of the object or the nature of the act itself. For instance, when the 
insecticide DDT was commercialised for the same time, the devastating ecological 
consequences were not known, and certainly not willed. These consequences were 
only discovered later. It would be absurd to call the initial commercialising of DDT 
an action that was morally wrong, when no one knew of its consequences.22 
 In spite of the foregoing criticism, however, I do not want to claim that utili-
tarianism is to be damned outright. It remains a plausible moral theory on condition 
that its abstractive nature is understood and taken into consideration. In other words, 
it can be a useful tool on condition that it doesn’t consider itself a complete theory. In 
science, more and more variables may be introduced to arrive at closer and closer ap-
proximations. For instance the equation of free fall mentioned above may be aug-
                                                 
22 DDT (the chemical dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) was used effectively in World War II to eradi-
cate the mosquitoes that caused malaria. There was hope that it would be the miracle chemical that 
would rid the world of harmful insects. Rachel Carson blew the whistle in her Silent Spring, London: 
1963, where she offers convincing proof that the use of such pesticides on one species affect other spe-
cies, even those living very far away. She insisted that ‘in nature nothing exists alone’. 
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mented so as to include the effects of air resistance, angular momentum, and so forth. 
In a similar way, utilitarianism may be augmented with the addition of other variables 
so as to include, in some way, the crucial aspects related to persons, to the nature of 
the act, and to circumstances.23 
3. Summing up  
 My original aim was to determine what we can learn from a comparison be-
tween science, relativism and utilitarianism. I started by analysing the prima faciae 
difference between science as essentially absolutist and ethics as essentially relativist, 
and showed that the two disciplines are not all that different. I defended an element of 
objectivity for both ethics and science by showing that there are at least two plausible 
ways of understanding what I will called ‘open objectivity’. The precedent approach 
corresponds to case-law. The secondary-precept approach involved the distinction 
between primary and secondary precepts. The basic idea here is that some secondary 
precepts can be confronted with the considerable variability that results from the con-
tingent nature of human actions and circumstances. 
 As regards science and utilitarianism, I focused on abstraction. The crucial 
issue here was the way both scientists and utilitarian moral philosophers choose the 
relevant parameters for their understanding. Deformation results if the choice of pa-
rameters is not correct. My basic argument was that utilitarianism, like economics, 
tends to sell itself as an exact science that deals with ideal cases, where the factors left 
out of consideration are negligible. This is deeply problematic, as I showed by con-
sidering three specific areas.  
 If anything, my exploration has shown how the complexity of reality obliges 
us to be always aware of the limitations of our methods. In general, we can ask: What 
should we do to gain a clearer and richer view of how things are? The answer is clear: 
we should see to it that the good ‘informants’ we choose from our group be positioned 
differently. Having different view-points is not just to be tolerated. It is to be encour-
aged. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Amartya Sen has been working on a formal approach to the understanding of the different compo-
nents that constitute happiness. He calls them independent vectors that allow a summation indicating 
the degree to which an individual has a good life. The basic idea here is that a full conception of hap-
piness for an individual is not a single property but consists of various components, to each of which is 
assigned a weight. The situation becomes complex because we cannot assume that the different possi-
ble life courses for an individual are fully comparable or commensurable. This vector-view of the no-
tion of utility is introduced in: A. Sen, ‘Plural Utility’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 81 
(1980), pp. 193-218. His related capabilities-approach is well presented in: A. Sen, ‘Capability and 
well-being’, in: The Quality of Life, edited by M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993, pp. 30-53. 
